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I. Background

Part of who we are is whom we communicate with. That basic premise,
that our family and friends affect our own personality, is accepted even in
academic treatises that promote nature over nurture as determinants of
personality (McCrae & Costa Jr. et al., 2000). Social capital, as a theory, is
directly tied to that notion; we build a fund based on friendship and trust and
favors – a trust fund, figuratively – and we “invest” in jobs or other relationships
for the sake of personal benefit. Harvard Professor Robert Putnam’s 1995
Journal of Democracy paper and the follow-up book, Bowling Alone, hypothesize
that America has declining social capital. As one critical reviewer, Carl Boggs,
puts it, Putnam says that America is experiencing a “collapse of networks of
interaction among individuals that imbue human life with qualities needed for
community, collective action, and democratic participation [i.e. social capital]”
(Boggs, 281). Boggs takes issue with numerous aspects of Bowling Alone, from
the groups Putnam uses (the Rotary Club, bowling leagues, etc) to the
fundamental notion of connectivity between social capital and political action. But
if Putnam is right, what hope is there? Ellison et al. believe that the Internet is a
good generator of social capital: “Because online relationships may be supported
by technologies like distribution lists, photo directories, and search capabilities
(Resnick, 2001), it is possible that new forms of social capital and relationship
building will occur in online social network sites” (Ellison et al., 2007). On the
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other hand, Putnam believes more in the power of local relationships: "The
challenge the country faces today is to do the equivalent of reinventing the Boy
Scouts or the Rotary Club,” and he believes that the Internet is incapable of this
reinvention (Putnam 2000, 17).
Has Putnam has misjudged the efficacy of aspects of Internet-generated
relationships? Recent Internet-aided phenomena like the 2011 Arab Spring
suggest that the Internet can contribute to social activism, and to a large degree.
Through a series of experiments utilizing agent-based modeling (ABM), I try to
triangulate the effect of non-local interactions – those connections that are not
predicated on being face-to-face, such as the types of interactions generated by
the Internet. I say triangulate because I approach it from three perspectives: (1)
testing whether institutionalization of an idea or a political identity to hegemonic
levels can occur in societies with limited face-to-face interaction; (2) examining
whether collective action can occur in such societies; and (3) trying to determine
how a landscape (i.e., an environment or society) changes when its connections
shift from face-to-face to non-local. Before discussing the parameters of this
experiment, it is worth outlining the theoretical foundation of social capital,
viewed from the literature and translated to terms of agent-based models.

Bowling Alone
Putnam concedes that one form of social capital may be “the Internet chat
group in which you participate” (Putnam 2000, 21). He later goes on, “The
Internet may be part of the solution to our civic problem, or it may exacerbate it”
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(170). Putnam raises four serious concerns about the Internet that he believes
could exacerbate the problem: 1) Inequality of access. This is a problem that has
seemingly been rapidly reduced with time, as shown later in Figure 1. 2) Inability
to transmit nonverbal information. At the time of publication, Putnam’s concern
was valid, but this problem now seems surmountable with the advent and
popularization of video chatting through programs like Skype, YouTube, and
instant messengers. 3) “Cyberbalkanization,” which implies that we will confine
our communication to people who share precisely our interests. This is a valid
concern – why search the Internet for something you are not interested in? I will
explore the possibility that Internet use leads to cyberbalkanization in two
experiments, described later. Putnam’s final concern is 4) the possibility that the
Internet will become “a means of… passive, private entertainment… [eventually
crowding out] face-to-face ties” (174-179). I also explore this question. Thus, this
thesis examines the type of ties that the Internet can generate, whether those
ties can be politically meaningful, and the possibility that increase in Internet use
will limit exposure to external interests.

The Importance of the Internet
The use of Internet-generated and other non-local forms of interaction is
rapidly increasing. As a recent New York Times article mentioned, “American
teenagers sent and received an average of 2,272 text messages per month in
the fourth quarter of 2008, according to the Nielsen Company – almost 80
messages a day, more than double the average of a year earlier” (Hafner May 29
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2010, The New York Times, D1). As Figure 1 shows, Americans are using the
Internet at an almost exponentially increasing rate. It seems the recipe is there
for Internet-generated social capital to take off.
Figure 1: Internet Use of College Students

Figure 1: Internet usage is going up – college students use the Internet a lot
more than the general population (generally speaking, older generations). This is
as of 2005 – no doubt the trends have continued. Clearer, larger image available
at: http://www.onlinecolleges.net/images/SurfingHabitsCollegeStudents.jpg
Putnam fails to consider several key aspects of the Internet – for example,
perhaps in the Internet era we do not need to be physically close to those whom
we trust most or who most influence us. It may also be that the Internet creates a
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different connection that is also valuable. Recent examinations suggest that
social media such as Facebook can greatly benefit an individual’s “bridging social
capital,” and that “the Internet can be a convenient and efficient means of
maintaining existing social ties and/or of creating new ties” (Ellison et al., 2007;
Penard & Poussing, 2010). However, other scholars take a middle ground: “It is
evident from our work that Internet is linked to both increase and decrease in
social capital” (Phulari et al., 2010).
The 2011 Arab Spring has underscored the urgency of understanding
effects of new social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. That
region-wide revolt was sparked by online activists speaking out against a brutal
regime, spreading the tale of Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation and
mobilizing citizens to overthrow their governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and
Yemen. The revolts that followed the immolation were orchestrated through
social networking sites in conjunction with more local meetings and protests.
It is clear that social media are expanding in unpredictable ways: for
example, one new website, Collaborative Chronic Care Network (C3N), uses
Internet-generated collaboration among doctors across the globe to provide realtime second opinions and advice on treatments with proven improvements to
patient prognoses (http://c3nproject.org/). Another recent example is the
admirable mobilization of the online community that occurred while Congress
debated the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA). The
protests sparked by online activity stopped both acts in their tracks.
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One notable implication of the explosion of social media is the possibility
of “diminishing marginal returns” for each connection, or the idea that each unit of
social capital generated from a connection means less and less since every
additional relationship may mean that another relationship is receiving less
investment. The basic premise is that the more relationships one has, particularly
at the acquaintance level, the less unique and valuable each relationship is. It
may be inferred that these relationships are less important and, as a result, are
more easily disposed of or discounted.

Defining Social Capital
Notwithstanding the intriguing explosion of social media as a vehicle for
political change, the effect of the Internet on social capital growth is still unclear,
in part because it is unclear what we mean when we say “social capital.”
Unfortunately, social capital seems to have become a trendy catchall explanation
for success. It is often presented like a societal miracle-grow, with benefits
ranging from better grades to better jobs to better life in general. Because
scholars measure social capital in so many different ways, it has become an
easy explanatory variable on which to pin a phenomenon that may or may not be
related. If the literature would be believed, social capital has its fingers in nearly
every aspect of society and life.
Educational benefits of social capital are numerous and well-documented:
“Several researchers have shown a connection between strong relationships and
student achievement (Bank & Slavings, 1990; Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Garnier &
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Raudenbush, 1991; Jones & Maloy, 1988; Lareau, 1987; Lee & Croninger, 1994;
Sui-Chu & Douglas, 1996)” (Goddard 2003, 59). Other researchers echo and
dissect the education findings: “attendance at a Catholic school and living with
both biological parents are associated with a child possessing more social
capital” (Teachman et al. 1996, 779).
Social capital keeps businesses alive: “Social capital serves to provide
sustainable competitive advantages to organizations in the form of
entrepreneurial behavior (Chung & Gibbon, 1997), firm survival (Pennings, Lee
and Van Wooteloostujin, 1998) and intellectual capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998)” (Watson and Papamarcos 2002, 538). But it also illustrates the racial
divide in the business world: “Whites generally have more access to those social
capital resources than blacks,” resulting in better career outcomes for whites
(Parks-Yancy 2006, 536-541).
Social capital is described as geographic in nature, based on local
interactions: “Social capital is a geographic concept (Mohan and Mohan 2002,
193; see also Bebbington and Perreault 1999)… based on family kinship and
locality” (Adger 2003, 390-392). Perreault expands on the notion: “Social capital,
as a function of social relations, is necessarily embedded within space and place”
(Perreault 2003, 331).
Social capital is particularly popular because, as Frans Schuurman (2003)
argues, it can be so widely applicable, from economists to sociologists.
Educational sociologists used social capital to explain (as James Coleman
put it) why some kids do better than others; criminologists referred to
social capital to explain why crime rates in some neighborhoods are lower
than in others; social and community psychologists used social capital in
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relation to income inequality to explain differences in mortality rates;
development experts used social capital (as in some of the cases
presented above) to examine why and how some development projects
fail or succeed; and the worryingly slow pace of democratization in the
former Eastern Europe was taken to be partly the result of a general lack
of social capital, which was not facilitated under communist regimes
(Schuurman 2003, 992).
The breadth of social capital’s effect makes it seem as though one would be
hard-pressed to find an aspect of society unrelated to social capital. It is almost
as if theorists would argue that social capital is society itself.
There does not seem to be a consensus definition of what social capital is
and what it is not. However, there is agreement that social capital entails some
measure of trust and that it leads to bettering one’s socioeconomic status,
whether through education or business or job opportunities or idea dissemination
writ large. I aim to narrow the definition, and operationalize it in agent-based
modeling terms, in order to help improve the clarity and usefulness of the
concept of social capital. Agent-based modeling can contribute to the literature
and help us learn about the true definition of social capital, and its effects on
society.
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II. Agent-Based Modeling
Modeling Origins: John Conway’s Game of Life
The origins of agent-based modeling lie in a powerful simulation program
– Princeton mathematician John Conway’s Game of Life.1 The Game of Life runs
on two simple rules: if a cell (in agent-based modeling lingo, an “agent”) is
surrounded by exactly 3 lit up cells, it also lights up. If, however, it is surrounded
by any number of squares other than 2 or 3, it will not light up, or darken as the
case may be. The rules may be operationalized by a single principle, as Dan
Dennett describes:
For each cell in the grid, count how many of its eight neighbors are on at
the present instant. If the answer is exactly two, the cell stays in its
present state (on or off) in the next instant. If the answer is exactly three,
the cell is on in the next instance whatever its current state. Under all
other conditions, the cell is off (Dennett 1995, 167).
This simple principle is not to be underestimated in its ability create and simulate
important phenomena.
The fundamental idea of the Game of Life is that simple rules can cause
complex results; from the Game’s simple parameter arise very intricate patterns.
Thus, the microbehavior of agents results in complex macrobehavior in the
landscape. A particular configuration of agents will, for example, create a “glider”
– a shape that seems to “move” across the landscape, even though technically
speaking no agent ever moves. Indeed, it is possible to create entire ecosystems
of gliders and predators (configurations that specialize in annihilating gliders

1

Available online at: http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/
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while retaining their own shape), as well as any number of patterns. As Dennett
notes, Conway’s team:
Designed, and proved the viability of the design of, a self-reproducing
entity composed entirely of Life cells that was also (for good measure) a
Universal Turing machine – it was a two-dimensional computer that in
principle can compute any computable function (171).
The size of that Turing machine would need to be “about six times that of
Monaco,” but the theoretical power of the Game is undeniable (173).

Agent-Based Modeling (ABM): PS-I
Agent-based models in the PS-I (originally standing for Political Science –
Identity) platform adhere to a few simple rules. Every agent has a Moore
neighborhood – it is surrounded by and listens to 8 agents. These agents are
activated on different identities – a term corresponding to politically salient
groups. Time is represented by timesteps, the mechanism that advances an
agent’s identity weight calculation. An identity weight is the aggregated total of
the agent’s own influence, plus the influence of agents in its Moore
neighborhood, plus the identity’s bias score. Bias accounts for all factors below
the analytic horizon, and is a number added to an identity’s total influence – if
Agent X is activated on ID0 (an arbitrary assignment meaning Identity #0,
represented in landscapes by the color red), and ID0 has a bias of 1, Agent X
counts its own influence, plus the bias, to determine ID0’s identity weight for it. If
its neighbors are also activated on ID0, bias is not double-counted – only the
agents’ influence is counted. Agents typically have a sight range of 1 – they
cannot see beyond their Moore neighborhood. If Agent X is on ID0 and has an
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influence level of 1, and ID0 has a bias of 1, its identity weight for ID0 starts at 2.
If its neighbors are all activated on ID1, and all have influence levels of 1, and
ID1’s bias is 2, then ID1 will have an aggregate influence of 10. If that number
surpasses Agent X’s current identity’s influence plus the “rotation trigger” (a
numerical threshold representing how much greater a new ID’s influence weight
must be compared to the activated ID), then Agent X will deactivate on ID0, and
activate on ID1.
In my experiments, I increase the sight radius (SR, synonymous with Sight
Range), so that a given agent can see beyond its Moore neighborhood. I also
adjust the listening percentage (LP), so that even though agents can see
significantly more agents, they will only listen to the influence of a percentage of
those agents. For example, at SR 10, 400 agents are visible to any given agent
(SR10 means a 20 by 20 grid is visible to the

Figure 2: PS-I, a platform for ABM

agent). I adjust the LP to, for example,
2.00%, such that 8 of those 400 agents are
exerting influence on Agent X, and a different
random subset of 8 agents exert influence on
Agent Y, etc.
That this simple set-up can create
complex macrobehaviors is the foundation of
agent-based models. Agent-based models
add capabilities and complexity to Conway’s
game as a means to create a powerful

Figure 2: A cutout of a typical PS-I
landscape. Agents influence the
agents immediately surrounding
them -- their "neighborhood." Each
color represents a different identity.
Agents with internal boxes are
"influential" agents that exert more
influence on their neighbors.
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system that can simulate trends and patterns in real life, using simple
relationships and information. Models can be as simple as the model shown in
Figure 2 – a torus with several identities and influential agents based on a
specific paradigm for a given experiment. However, models can become
complex. For example, by supplying demographic and geographic information,
one can create models of entire nations and predict salient political activity and
outcomes in those countries (Lustick 2003). Such models are relatively easy to
learn how to create with a user-friendly modeling platform, such as Ian Lustick’s
PS-I.
PS-I is a powerful agent-based modeling platform. The program is based
on such foundational experiments as Thomas Schelling’s exhibition of
segregation, in which he showed that societies segregate given a modicum of
desire to be around similar groups. PS-I is Lustick’s simulation platform founded
on evolutionary and constructivist theory, and is illustrated abstractly by John
Conway’s Game of Life. It uses individual agents that represent the collection of
identities most prevalent to a person or group of persons, as well as the
interactions among people. Lustick summarizes agent-based modeling:
[Agent-based modeling] assumes that simple behaviors of the interacting
units at the micro level are known and asks what patterns, distributions of
outcomes, and law-like regularities on the macro level are more likely to
emerge given variable circumstances, initial conditions, policy changes, or
variation in those assumptions (Lustick, 2002).
Each agent has several identities, and each agent is activated on only one
identity at a time. For example, I am simultaneously a Penn student, a research
assistant, a member of Mask and Wig, a Phillies fan, and a political science
student. Right now, I am activated, so to speak, on my political science student
identity. The others are still in my “repertoire” of identities but are slightly less

Gur 14
prevalent; I am constructed of many identities, but at any moment some single
one is, for modeling purposes, assumed to be most prevalent. Landscapes
feature hundreds of such agents, and as Putnam would predict, in PS-I the social
outcomes, including everything from segregation to rebellion to ethnic conflict,
are based on local relationships. That is to say, an agent interacts with its Moore
neighborhood. Every agent in the Moore
neighborhood has its own identity and
repertoire of non-activated identities, and

Figure 3: Virtual Bangladesh –
A PS-I interpretation of
Bangladesh

each exerts influence on its own neighbors.
There are enhancements to increase
ecological validity – some agents exert more
influence than others, some agents see
further than others thus exerting influence on
more agents, and so on. As noted, these
simple layers compound to a complexity that
can create a structural framework capable of
predicting social phenomena and political
futures (Lustick, 2003). One example of such
a framework, applied to the national level, is
shown in Figure 3: Virtual Bangladesh.
Agent-based modeling could be an
optimal platform to identify social capitalrelated effects. In order to operationalize
social capital, it is necessary to examine the
“capital” metaphor. The goal of breaking

Figure 3: VirBang, a PS-I model of
Bangladesh. The squares are
agents, and the different colors are
different identities. The central
region, mostly blue, is Dhaka –
Bangladesh’s capital. A huge portion
of its population is comprised of
textile workers, which is what the
blue identity represents. Other colors
include Military (yellow), Muslim
(green), and Corrupt (white, more
sparse). The identities are originally
laid out using a randomization
function within specific areas – if
75% of Dhakans are textile workers,
we give 75% of the Dhaka region,
randomly, the textile worker identity,
even though some may be activated
on other identities (e.g. Muslim, etc).
Image courtesy of Ian Lustick.
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down the capital metaphor is to operationalize social capital into an agent-based
modeling landscape in which agents communicate with one another on a
primarily non-proximal (i.e. non-local) basis to simulate the effects of digital
communication.
My fundamental thesis question is: Can social capital generated from online
social media mitigate the decline that Putnam has noticed in social capital
generated from face-to-face interactions? If so, to what extent and in what ways?
To address this question I will compare experimental simulation results between
landscapes with exclusively face-to-face interaction and landscapes without faceto-face interaction.
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III. Operationalizing Social Capital
Defining social capital is a multifaceted problem. The “social” part of the
term seems straightforward to define – something is “social” if it relates to human
society, welfare, or the connections and interdependent relations among
humans.2 Distilled, we may call an event “social” if it involves human interaction.
The more amorphous “capital” seems harder to define. Microeconomics
defines physical capital as “the tools, instruments, machines, buildings, and other
constructions that businesses use to produce goods and services,” while “we talk
about money, stocks, and bonds as… financial capital” (Parkin 2008, 4). If
financial capital is invested money (money in the form of stocks or bonds), and
physical capital is a purchased physical commodity, social capital must be
invested human interaction with no more fungibility than invested physical or
financial capital. However, such a definition fails to illuminate some implications
of the term capital – for example, how does one “invest” human interaction?
Social capital theorists, led by Putnam, argue that an individual does not
invest human interaction, but rather social capital is an already-invested resource
– social capital is that interaction type that lubricates the process of cooperation.
Many definitions of social capital implicitly or explicitly include “trust” (Goddard,
2006; Adger, 2003; Parks-Yancy, 2006; Watson & Papamarcos, 2002; StantonSalazar & Dornbusch, 1995; Meyerson, 1994; Coleman, 1998). Putnam defines
social capital as: “[the] features of social organization such as networks, norms,
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”
2

From www.merriam-webster.com
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(Putnam 1995, 66). The keywords for Putnam are organization and facilitate – it
is not social capital if it does not facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation, and it
is not social capital if it is not a part of an organizational network. Since networks
are amalgamations of connections, often with a common goal linking those
connections, the “features” he describes are also, in essence, connections.
Social capital, then, as per Putnam, refers to those network connections that
ease symbiotic cooperation.

Social Capital vs. Economic Capital
Although Putnam’s definition is helpful, especially in its emphasis on the
infrastructural nature of social capital, it must be supplemented and parsed for
clarity. For example, capital implies currency – what is the currency of social
capital? If it is trust, the implication is that trust can be earned, lost, or traded –
certainly the first two are possible, but the fundamental nature of trust belies the
possibility of trading. If it can be traded, at the least it would not be for a one-toone value – if Person A trusts Person B who trusts Person C, A may trust C by
association but probably not on the same level that B trusts C or that A trusts B.
Therefore, there could be a transaction cost for trust, if trust is indeed the
currency of social capital – an interesting thought worth researching, but outside
the scope of this paper. It should be noted that if trust is that currency, what we
may have created is a comparative nightmare, since different cultures and
societies value and interpret trust in different ways. What is the exchange rate of
American trust to Japanese trust? Does American trust not transfer to Iranian
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trust, since those two countries have been at odds for some time? Does trust in
Baltimore, Maryland mean the same as trust in Greenwich, Connecticut?
Quantifying trust may be doable, but it is a tall order. Because of this difficulty, I
will operationalize social capital in a different way – on a landscape level.
Can the comparison between social and economic capital continue, even
without a clear form of currency transfer? The fundamental raison d’être for
currency is that it is a form of universally accepted debt repayment. One agrees
to obtain a chair (or any item) and cancel the debt through money. The purchase
of a chair is viable through the seller trusting the currency of the buyer. Indeed,
we often buy things on “credit,” which is promise of future money that would fail if
the third party – the credit card company – did not trust the owner of the card, or
if the seller did not trust the credit company. Either way, ultimately economic
capital uses money for the reimbursement. Social capital, according many
theorists, uses trust itself.
But what kind of price tag does trust carry? That is to say – a chair may
cost X dollars, but how much trust does a given action cost? Putnam’s definition
helps avoid the debate here – trust is different from money in that the emphasis
vis-à-vis social capital remains on the infrastructure of trust – an endowment of
trust, so to speak – that cannot be easily tapped and is closer in philosophical
theory to the economy as a whole than it is to a specific transaction between
consumer and producer. One cannot spend social capital, since social capital is
aspects of social infrastructure (networks) that enable mutually beneficial
cooperation, rather than more singular transactions. Similarly, one cannot spend
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the financial economy in a transaction – it is changed by a sum of transactions.
Additionally, the social capital metaphor implies concepts like social liquidity and
social fungibility, which reduces to trading trust for money or trust for trust.3
Putnam’s definition helps us dodge the thorny issue of trust, but given how
far down the path of trust the debate has traveled, it seems that social capital
could use a proverbial cosmetic makeover to set the story straight. Perhaps a
more appropriate fundamental term for the concept currently described as “social
capital’ is “social economy” – that is, social economy is the aspects of networks
that enable mutually beneficial cooperation. Such a renaming would seem
necessary because trust, like other amorphous terms such as love, is difficult to
quantify and define, which makes it difficult to apply to supporting or refuting
social capital theory. The reemphasis of the macro nature of social capital is an
added bonus of the renaming.
It seems intuitive that a social economy is not spendable in the same way
Putnam’s social capital is not spendable, and in the same way that the financial
economy is not spendable. This would make social capital akin to GDP –
individuals don’t have it, but participate in markets that result in the country’s
GDP. A social economic metaphor also allows for traditional economic parallels
– some people are socially rich, some poor, and most are in-between, and the
correlation between social economic status and monetary economic status is not
perfect (although it undoubtedly is worth investigating). In this case, social capital

3

Essentially, social liquidity would be the ability of trust to be converted into cash
quickly, while social fungibility would be mutually tradeable trust – the goal of which
would seemingly normally be money.
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might then become the quantity of connections that are part of the social
economy. This is still a difficult currency – viably trading connections does not
seem easy – but at least if Persons A and B have a connection, we can focus on
the objective outcome of that connection, rather than the emotional involvement
of that connection. Social media, such as Facebook, often encourage such
connections by suggesting users befriend “people you may know” who are
connected to users only through “mutual friends.”

Social Capital vs. Social Economy
Social capital has become a misnomer. Social economy would be a better
term, or is at least a better way to conceptualize the parameters of social capital,
and could possibly clarify areas of confusion in the literature. There is support for
the notion that social capital theory has not been thought through:
Social capital is correlated with many other social phenomena but often
the causal explanation does not match the degree of quantitative
sophistication of the correlation… First, there are theoretical difficulties in
linking attitudinal data (i.e. in the case of defining social capital at the
individual level) with macroeconomic and political outcomes. Second,
social capital or trust represented as a statistical score does not reflect the
underlying distributions, which may vary according to national or regional
patterns. In general this is indeed a reflection of the lack of theorization
with respect to social capital. Another indication of the latter point is that
sometimes (the lack of) social capital is used as a metaphor ('a society
without an adequate stock of social capital is sick') and is not meant to be
operationalised, measured, correlated or used analytically (Schuurman
2003, 1001).
Schuurman posits that common definitions and quantifications of social capital
are severely lacking. He argues that the common quantification of social capital
as a response pattern on a survey questioning respondents’ degree of trust in
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one another is society-dependent, and societies view trust differently.
Comparative political scientists would agree that societies could vary greatly in
this regard – especially with a concept as fuzzy, instinctual, and difficult to define
as “trust.” Furthermore, Schuurman points out that when we define social capital
at the individual level, theorists jump from that individual level to the macro
societal level without paying attention to logical issues inherent to such a leap.
What are some of those theoretical issues that so many authors ignore?
Perhaps the simplest one is that describing social capital in individual terms does
not make any sense at the definitional level – an individual cannot be a network,
though he may be a part of a network. It is the network that possesses social
capital, not the individual. Arguably the name capital itself is at fault; individuals
can accumulate financial capital, which leads to the misconception that they may
also actively accumulate social capital. If the aspects of social networks that are
beneficial were to be termed as “social economy,” perhaps much of this
confusion would be avoided.
Frank, Zhao, and Borman argue that social capital is “manifest when one
actor allocates resources to another” with regard to schools (Frank et al. 2004,
155). This phrasing seems to be in the right direction; one does not manifest
social capital – a society has social capital, and it is observable – not obtainable
– through the actions of individuals. If social capital is not uniquely a societallevel phenomenon, that would imply that actors within the society could possess
social capital, and that the United States, for example, has a social capital
quantity that is the sum of its citizens’ individual social capital. However, if an
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individual has social capital, how did she acquire it? Does the network enable
her, as would align with Putnam’s definition that social capital is composed of
certain aspects of a network? In that case, must not the network have social
capital inherent to it in the first place? And, if a network gives its individuals social
capital, how does the network ever gain or lose that capital? Does social capital
that goes unused simply decay into nothing? Rather than certain actors prepossessing or somehow earning quantities of social capital, if we instead say that
a society has a social economy, then actors exist in a social economy that gains
its capital not from the individuals, but from the quantity and quality of
connections made among individuals. Actors simply utilize the links of the social
economy, investing in various stocks – connections – and playing a socioeconomic game that leaves some wealthy and others destitute.
In a social economy, an actor can move from landscape to landscape (i.e.,
from city to city, workplace to workplace, environment to environment), and
certain actors are predisposed to increased levels of communication. The
landscapes (i.e., the networks) that these actors congregate in will be areas of
high social capital as a result of the density of their congregation and their
predisposition to communication. However, the social capital of the landscape
occurs because of the actors, and yet the social capital does not belong to the
actors and cannot be used by the actors – rather, it can be utilized. The actors
cannot use other actors, but they can use the connections of those actors. It is
not that actors create social capital – it is that actors create connections, some of
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which may be useful, and those connections are the links that create the social
economy.
What support is there for such a theory? Das points out that in India, class
issues can negatively impact the ability of a class to build social capital (Das
2004, 31-32). A class is essentially the bonds shared by actors of a similar
socioeconomic background, or in some cases a similar racial or ethnic
background, or otherwise institutionalized differences (like India’s caste system).
Strife among classes could break down the connections among actors in each
class, which would in turn reduce the social economy of a society. This impacts
the society at all levels, and reduces the net social economy – and the ability of
actors to utilize those connections. If the actors are not communicating, there are
no bonds, and the social economy is weakened.
The symbiotic relationship between actor and social economy would be
typical of a social structure. In agent-based models, as Dennett has shown
(1995, 169-173), microbehavior leads to macropatterns, meaning that the
behavior of individual actors causes and describes the patterns of the landscape
– in this case, the social economy.
Putnam also lends support to the basic definitional notion that social
capital is not about the individual. He argues: “Life is easier in a community
blessed with a substantial stock of social capital” (Putnam 1995, 66). Firstly, it is
important to note that, again, Putnam is saying a community, not an individual, is
the reservoir of social capital. He says that the power behind social capital comes
from the grid of connections – the network – of a society:
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Networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized
reciprocity… [and] facilitate coordination and communication, amplify
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved
(ibid).
In a social economy, those actors predisposed to utilizing connections are the
prime facilitators of collective action – the social brokers and traders.
Further support comes from the “many studies [that] have found that
unemployment periods can be detrimental to maintaining social capital” (Pénard
and Poussing 2005, 13). In a social economy, this makes perfect sense – as
unemployment goes up, opportunities for connections go down, because the
workplace is a prime location for connections to be formed and utilized. The
workplace has individuals trying to make connections for the sake of their own
advancement; promotion and opportunity are often as much about who you know
as they are about your resume. Additionally, the workplace is an environment in
which people are forced to work with each other daily, for significant amounts of
time – even those who do not want to create connections are more likely to do so
in the workplace than in isolation. The workplace, fundamentally, is a hub of
connectivity. When there is an economic crisis and unemployment rate
increases, then, it would not be a surprise to see society’s social economy
experiencing the same downturn as the financial economy. A noteworthy
inference can therefore be made – the social economy has a direct relationship
with the financial economy. When society makes more connections there are
more opportunities for those connections to be utilized for financial economic
benefit, and when the financial economy is in a decline, there are fewer
opportunities for connections.
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That the social economy and the financial economy are tied is an
increasingly popular view of economists (Schuurman 2003, 992). But it is unclear
which direction the causal mechanism takes. The dot com boom of the turn of the
millennium may offer some evidence in one direction: the boom of Internet
websites and the resulting financial economic bubble may have been a
consequence of a major increase in the number of societal connections and the
networks laid down before the boom, and the resulting collapse may have been
due to the unstable, superficial nature of those connections (Phulari et al. 2010,
94). A few good ideas spearheaded the way for the Internet, led to increased
involvement from entrepreneurs, increased linkage between those
entrepreneurs, and a subsequent collapse when the bad ideas went bankrupt
and dragged good ideas down with them.
For now, let us stick with social capital and assume that Putnam et al. are
taking a macro view of capital, and not an individualistic micro view. Social
economy and social capital are equivalent. In that case, there are several
implications for an agent-based model of social capital. First, the feature of the
model that will be tested will be the entire landscape’s social capital, and not
individual agents’ social capital. Second, in agent-based modeling terms mutually
beneficial cooperation between agents would take the form of identity building. If
agents are working together for one another’s benefit, that would mean they have
low tension (which measures the connections an agent has with agents on other
identities). This also means that they have the same identity – and the influence
they have on each other is all a part of a positive feedback into their own identity.
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Thus, they are helping each other and themselves because they are all on the
same identity – a part of the same network. Third, it does not follow that the
entire landscape being activated on any given identity implies greater landscape
social capital. Social capital theory does not suggest homogeneity in thought or
action; rather it rests on ease of mutually beneficial cooperation. A sign of
mutually beneficial cooperation is overcoming of the collective action problem.4
Agents interacting with other agents on the same identity is a sign of this, but a
better sign might be a landscape in which a minority identity is able to overthrow
a regime identity, or at least siphon some of its influence, because even though it
would be better for an agent to be on the regime identity, the strength of its
group’s connections means that the agents go against the regime anyway.

Varieties of Social Capital
It is possible – indeed, probable – that there are several forms of social
capital (Schuurman 2003, 239). There are two types of social capital common in
the literature, though many authors offer their own variations. The two main
varieties are bridging social capital and bonding social capital. Bridging social
capital is, essentially, loose connections among individuals, the primary purpose
of which is information bartering or otherwise generally superficial exchanges.
The second variety is bonding social capital, which is a familial-style relationship
in which individuals may rely extensively on one another (Phulari et al. 2010, 94).

4

The collective action problem is the notion that what is best for a group is not
necessarily best for its individual members. It would be irrational for a given member to
take that action, even though it would be rational for the group to do so.
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Several authors contend that the Internet’s strength in terms of generating social
bonds lies in bridging capital, rather than bonding capital (Pénard and Poussing
2005, 19; Phulari et al. 2010, 94).
Other varieties of social capital are basically similar. Putnam (2000) and
Wellman et al. (2001) offer three kinds of social capital:
Network capital (informal relations among friends, neighbors and
colleagues), participatory capital (involvement in politics and voluntary
organizations), and community commitment (trust and engagement toward
the community). Using U.S. data, [Putnam and Wellman] find that Internet
use supplements network capital and increases participatory capital, yet
undermines community commitment (Pénard and Poussing 2005, 4).
It may be inferred that bridging capital essentially equates to network capital, plus
the more informal relationships associated with participatory capital, whereas
bonding capital is reserved for those heads-of-organizations and communities
who build strong relationships with their peers. This interpretation is not one I
have come across elsewhere, but satisfies the definitional needs for the
purposes of this paper.

Social Capital in ABM: A Simple Probe with Identity Dominance
One initial question is how does the Internet affect spreading of an
identity? After all, since social capital is connections, a landscape with more
social capital – connections beneficial to agents of a given identity’s own network
– will have those agents utilize those connections, and seek to spread their own
identity. The degree and speed with which an identity spreads could be an
indication that there are many positively beneficial connections. More social
capital would mean that a good idea that everyone likes would spread more
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quickly. Therefore, the first experiment is a measurement of the speed and
magnitude with which a dominant identity took over a landscape.
This is admittedly a crude measurement. Social capital is not entirely
about identity homogeneity, which is what this experiment depicts. But using it in
conjunction with several other experiments can help identify and isolate the
social capital of landscapes with higher sight range. These experiments will
measure how effective far-apart interactions are at spreading an identity
compared to how effective local interactions are at spreading an identity. It may
be inferred that the speed with which identity takes over and the percent of the
landscape that the identity takes over are indications of the landscape’s ability to
support easy symbiotic cooperation on a network level – which is what social
capital is.

Social Capital in ABM: Using Institutions
In one set of ABM simulations, Rousseau and van der Veen find that “the
interaction of actors creates a social structure that, in turn, regulates and
constitutes the actors. The mutually constitutive assumption makes it impossible
to talk about actors without reference to structure (and vise versa)” (Rousseau
and van der Veen 2005, 689). To fully operationalize social capital, we need an
agent-based model that incorporates concepts of identity construction and
identity dominance beyond simple landscape homogeneity, plus rules that
actively allow agents to work together. Agent-based modeling offers such a
paradigm.
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Ian Lustick and Dan Miodownik’s 2002 paper, “The Institutionalization of
Identity: Micro Adaptation, Macro Effects, and Collective Consequences” (Lustick
and Miodownik, 2002), presents an agent-based model of institutionalization.
They established that, given an initial 54% of their experimental landscape, an
identity becomes dominant at an exponentially higher rate than if given an initial
53% of the landscape. They argue that this constitutes an entrenchment of
dominance, which can be understood as an institutionalization of an identity. This
has implications for social capital; if the infrastructure of a business is law and
order, electricity, financial capital, and the like, then constructions of regulated,
mutually beneficial social interactions – i.e., institutions – are the infrastructure of
social capital. One can render institutions as expressions of social capital, with
some landscapes having more face-to-face interactions and others having
primarily remote interactions. If an identity in a landscape is institutionalized with
relative ease over the course of the landscape histories, it is an indication that
the landscape has a lot of social capital. One could then see whether the
threshold point for institutionalization changes when SR is increased, and
whether the slope of the curve for identity dominance of a landscape changes
when SR is increased. That, in effect, would be asking whether an institution
gains strength from investment in remote social capital or proximal social capital.
If an institutionalized identity gains strength from remotely generated social
capital, it will augur in favor of the hypothesis that the Internet, with its
fundamental basis of remote social capital, can indeed mitigate the loss of social
capital caused by the increased number of Americans who now bowl alone.
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It is important to recognize caveats. As mentioned, increased prevalence
does not mean that a landscape has more social capital. Institutionalization is
only present if there is a stepwise function of increasing prevalence that has an
exponential jump – a phenomenon called hysteresis. If an identity that has been
institutionalized is put under equal and opposite stress as during the timestep
before institutionalization, it will maintain its institutionalization. A good
comparative example of hysteresis occurs in magnets. When a certain amount of
force is placed on metal, it becomes magnetized. Placing an equal and opposite
amount of force on that magnet does not demagnetize it, because magnetism
has become institutionalized in the metal, so to speak. A much greater amount of
variable force would be needed to demagnetize it. Similarly with institutions, an
identity is only institutionalized if it requires more than an equal and opposite
force to eliminate its dominance than was required to institutionalize its
dominance.
To execute this portion of my experiments, I use Lustick and Miodownik’s
basic experimental set-up, with minor alterations. In their experiments:
We seeded 11 landscapes at time zero (t = 0) with increasing percentages
of agents activating the “dominant” (gray) identity. The first landscape was
seeded with exactly 1200 (50% of the total population) dominant agents
and 1200 (50%) subordinate (“black”) agents. The next was seeded with
1224 (51%) gray, 1176 (49%) black, and so forth, until the last was
seeded with 1440 (60%) gray, 960 (40%) black. We then ran each of the
landscapes 20 times, allowing each to evolve during 500 generations (t =
500). Thus, we generated and recorded the outcomes of 220 landscapes
(Lustick and Miodownik 2002, 34).
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I adopted the same experimental design, to reproduce their effect, but with a
second set of landscapes that involve primarily far-apart interactions between
agents.
Additionally, in order to try and triangulate the Internet’s effect on
landscape social capital, I examined another question: can the Internet help
overcome the collective action problem? Determining the answer to this would
shed light on Putnam’s concerns about the Internet and cyberbalkanization. I
examine this through testing the effect of listening percentage and sight range on
centralized and decentralized authority structures.

Social Capital in ABM: Centralized Authority Structures
A modification of Lustick’s 2006 attempt to define violence helps
triangulate the effect of social capital on landscapes. Although that paper is about
violence, and attempts to operationalize violence in an ABM, for purposes of my
inquiry into social capital I focused on one aspect of his model. Lustick creates a
regime structure in which a central authority figure lies in the middle of the map,
and from that central figure radiate several layers of influential agents, all aligned
on one identity. Part of the power of the regime is that it is centrally located; the
dominant identity creates an institution in the center of the map, whose spreading
influence is registered by the tendency of agents within and near the regime
network to activate on the identity shared by regime influentials. My model will
use this paradigm and measure the effect that a central authority structure has
on identity formation, in terms of a local neighborhood (SR = 1) and a non-local
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neighborhood (SR = 10). I will run the experiment such that, in the non-local
experimental group, there are variable numbers of agents listened to, just as in
the institutional experiments.
The non-local neighborhoods should diminish the importance of
geographic location, which is essential Lustick’s centralized authority structure. If
that were the only factor, one would expect the central authority’s identity to be
less dominant in non-local landscapes. On the other hand, the fact that the
central authority’s identity starts with an edge may give it that much greater of an
edge in non-local networks. Thus, if the landscape with Internet-type interactions
has more social capital, the network’s ability to help its own agents may be
greater, which means that there will be more agents activated on the central
authority’s identity in spite of the lost geographic advantage. The key to
dominance at the end could be the initial distribution of agents on each identity –
allocation, allocation, allocation.

Social Capital in ABM: Decentralized Authority Structures
In order to isolate the effect of geography, I will replicate the earlier
landscape, but without a centralized authority structure. Instead, the influential
agents will be randomly distributed across the landscape, though each level of
influence will have the same number of agents.
This experiment should help isolate the effect of geography on social
capital differences. If the non-proximal experiment group with a decentralized
authority structure has the same outcome as the non-proximal experimental
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group with a centralized authority structure, it will be further indication that
centralized authority is possibly less important in an Internet-based society. If it
can be demonstrated that any findings from the centralized regime experiment
are not due to geographic happenstance, but are instead solely due to increased
sight range and the change in social capital of the landscape, it will have
eliminated a possible confounding variable.
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IV. Experiments and Results
Identity Dominance
I created a few basic landscapes with the fundamentals of local and non-local
interactions. Four landscapes were made:
1. A landscape based on local interactions, where each agent influenced
(and was influenced by) the 8 agents next to it.
Sight Range (SR) = 1, Listening Percentage (LP) = 10000 (100%).
2. A landscape with slightly fewer local interactions, where each agent
influenced (and was influenced by) 5 agents next to it.
SR = 1, LP = 6250 (62.5%).
3. A landscape with only non-local interactions, where each agent influenced
(and was influenced by) 8 far away agents.
SR = 10, LP = 200 (2.00%).
4. A landscape with only non-local interactions, where each agent influenced
(and was influenced by) 5 far away agents.
SR = 10, LP = 125 (1.25%).
The landscape was painted such that ID0 had a slight majority of agents with
higher influence levels. 4% had influence level of three, of which 1.1% were
assigned to ID 0; 3% had influence level of five, of which 1% were assigned to ID
0; and .25% had influence level of 7, of which all were assigned to ID0. The rest
had influence levels of 2. The rationale was that having a few extra higher
influence level agents on ID0 would serve as sufficient strength for a somewhat
“first among equals” political clime identity.
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For the proximal landscapes, sight range was equal to 1 – agents could
see only those agents immediately around them, and affect other agents at a
range of 1. For the non-proximal landscapes, since the grid was 20x20, the sight
range and influence range was extended to 10, such that any given agent could
theoretically influence every other agent. The landscapes were designed such
that the only difference was the local vs. non-local relationships. This way, the
only differences would be due to the local vs. non-local variable. Finally, 100 runs
of 100 timesteps each for each landscape were executed.
Figure 4: Number of Agents on Dominant Identity for Each Landscape

1.25% SR10 means that 1.25% of the 400 agents in the neighborhood are
listened to – a total of 5 agents. Those maps with listening percent of 2.00% have
a total of 8 agents listened to. 62.5% of SR1 means that 62.5% of the
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neighborhood for a given agent at SR 1 is listened to, or 62.5% of 8 agents to
make a total of 5 agents listened to at SR1.
This listening percentage variable causes a notable phenomenon – certain
agents may exert no influence at all on other agents, while others may exert
influence with more than their fair share of agents. As Figure 4 shows, higher
listening percentages mean more agents on the dominant identity for both
proximal and non-proximal relationships, although the difference is more
pronounced with non-proximal relationships (SR10). Note that the green line
representing SR1 LP 62.5% is almost identical to – but slightly less than – the
purple line representing SR1 LP 100% – results for these two landscapes were
very similar, though 62.5% does indeed have fewer agents on the dominant
identity than 100%.

Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID) Experiments
In the SCID replication, as per Lustick’s SCID experiment itself, every
landscape had four identities, with the landscape divided between two identities
in a 50-50 to 60-40 ratio between the two identities – 11 total landscapes. Two
other identities were present, though they rarely achieved any activation. Each
landscape was run 20 times for 500 timesteps. It is important to note that in the
case of the 50-50 splits, the reciprocal percentage of dominance at timestep 500
could replace the highlighted percentage, but for consistency and clarity’s sake I
listed the ostensibly dominant identity (ID 0) in the graphs and tables.
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It is also important to note that these models are very simple – there is no
influential agent class, only basics. Additionally, border agents that had no
identity (and neither received nor exerted influence) limited the typical torus
structure of the landscape.
Figure 5: SCID Replication with Combined Results

Table 1: SCID Replications Combined Results
% Initial
% End Dominance for Initially Dominant ID
Dominance
LP 125
LP 200
LP 275
LP10kSR1
50
42.90%
20.21%
22.25%
53.89%
51
53.24%
50.90%
60.79%
52.52%
52
44.91%
42.91%
51.61%
53.60%
53
63.80%
46.45%
67.33%
50.90%
54
48.50%
36.71%
70.07%
67.59%
55
33.98%
86.64%
87.54%
64.13%
56
56.09%
54.19%
59.73%
65.25%
57
72.77%
78.83%
58.01%
65.13%
58
70.73%
86.96%
88.31%
73.09%
59
74.71%
40.67%
38.93%
76.95%
60
77.97%
88.92%
92.12%
73.27%
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Figure 5 and Table 1 represent the combined results of each listening
percentage. Individual graphs and tables, separated for each listening
percentage, are in Appendix I.
The baseline of LP10kSR1, which was the replicated SCID baseline in
Figure 5 and Table 1, showed significant jumps at 54% initial dominance and at
57% initial dominance (hereafter, the landscape initial dominance percentages
will be referred to without the percent symbol – i.e., 54 represents 54% initial
dominance). This is the same pattern that occurred in SCID – though the
magnitude of the jump was lower (8.5% in my replication versus 12% in the SCID
article). The peak was approximately 77% of the landscape on the initial
dominant identity at timestep 500, which occurred at 59. The lowest point was
approximately 51%, which occurred at 53.
This provides a useful baseline – institutionalization has been replicated,
and the same baseline files are used through all experiments. Only two variables
change: sight range increases to 10, and listening percentages ranging from 5 to
11 agents listened to per agent.
As Table 1 and Figure 5 show, the LP125 landscape featured several
major jumps, vacillating up and down before jumping more permanently at 56
(34% to 56) and immediately after again at 57 (from 56% to 73%). It is unclear
whether institutionalization has occurred – there are major jumps, and the graph
does not show a fall after 57, but the earlier vacillations make conclusions
difficult.
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With LP200, as Figure 5 and Table 1 show, the landscape did not achieve
institutionalization. The minimum percent of end dominance was 20%, occurring
at 50, while the maximum, occurring at 60, was 89%, with numerous vacillations
in between. The first major jump was from 20% to 51%, and occurred at 51.
Another occurred at 55, with a jump from 37% to 87% – however, there was a
major fall immediately after at 56, from 87% to 54%. The next major jump
occurred immediately after that, from 54% to 79%. But, yet again, a major fall
occurred at 59, from 87% to 41% – this was followed by a jump at 60 from 41%
to 89%.
The vacillations show that institutionalization did not occur, but the high
maxes suggest something else of note is going on – that perhaps as remote
listening percentage increases, so too does the magnitude of those vacillations.
This trend continued at LP275, as Figure 5 and Table 1 show. The pattern
was fairly similar to when 8 agents were listened to. There was a major jump
from 22% end dominance to 61% end dominance at 51. The landscape jumped
up to 67% at 54, and then jumped again at 55 to an end dominance of 88%. The
landscape fell back down, reaching 58% end dominance at 57, rose to 88% at
58, then crashed back to a second-lowest score of 39% end dominance at 59.
The landscape finished strongly, though, with a maximum end dominance of 92%
at 60. The standard deviations for all three experiments were high – ranging from
around 10% to nearly 30%, as Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix I show. The high
standard deviations suggest that more runs are needed to hone in on the real
percentages for each landscape.
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None of the landscapes had strong indication of institutionalization.
Indeed, at LP200 and LP275, the extreme vacillation suggests that the bias – the
numerically operationalized random variable that accounts for that which is below
the analytic horizon – was a strong factor in determining the landscape’s
composition. Thus, when one identity became fashionable, through luck, the
agents responded overwhelmingly in that identity’s favor, overcoming any
potential hysteresis factor. This suggests that the glue of the landscapes not
based on face-to-face interactions was of a weaker sort than that of the
landscapes with face-to-face interactions. These results may support Ellison et
al.’s suggestion that the Internet is a powerful provider of bridging capital, but not
necessarily bonding capital (Ellison et al., 2007).

Authority Structure Experiments
Table 2: Centralized Authority Structure (CAS) & Decentralized Authority
Structure (DAS) Regime Change
CAS:
LP
125
200
275
350
425
10000
DAS:
LP
125
200
275
350
425
10000

ID0
Agents
1087.1
1281.85
1162.9
440.85
1242.95
916.75
ID0
Agents
919.95
1277.35
1155.7
436.65
770.25
714.65

Tension per
Agent at t=1
220.5536
199.4904
201.4928
207.564
190.9736
4.6264
Tension per
Agent at t=1
228.6328
204.4408
202.868
198.3544
189.62
4.6368

Tension per
Agent at t=200
100.91468
66.3192
78.27076
95.65696
59.12516
2.26024
Tension per
Agent at t=200
114.80844
66.63996
67.34432
71.80396
75.18444
2.40372
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Table 2 shows the average number of agents on ID0 at timestep 200 for
each of the listening percentages in the CAS and DAS, as well as the average
tension per agent at timesteps 1 and 200 for each listening percentage.
The notable findings are that tension remained fairly consistent across
CAS and DAS at timestep 1, and was fairly similar as well for timestep 200. It can
be gleaned that the decentralized structure did not affect landscape tension per
agent. The landscape also further supported the conclusion from the identity
dominance experiments that sight range increase is strongly related to number of
agents on the dominant identity – only one of the SR10 landscapes (LP350) had
fewer agents at timestep 200 on the initially dominant identity than the SR1
landscape. At timestep 200, every other SR10 landscape had more agents on
the initially dominant identity than the SR1 landscape did.
Another finding of note is that tension per agent dropped significantly from
LP = 125 to LP = 200 in both DAS and CAS. Finally, it is clear that landscapes
with a higher sight range had significantly higher tension. This has worthwhile
implications for Putnam’s theory of cyberbalkanization – namely, that in a
landscape with far-apart interactions, tension (which measures the 8 agents in
the immediate vicinity of a given agent, regardless of sight range) will be higher if
cyberbalkanization is occurring. This is because a large number of agents will be
on a single identity, but those agents resisting – listening to only their ilk – will be
surrounded by a sea of agents on opposing identities. The result is massive
tension numbers for those agents in particular, meaning vast overall tension
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scores, and larger tension per given agent in SR10 landscapes than in SR1
landscapes.

Table 3: Collective Action in terms of Dismantling of the Regime, CAS
Key: Low = Influence Level 3, Mid = Influence Level 5, High = Influence
Level 7, Max = Influence Level 10.
LP125
Low
Mid
High
Max

Centralized Authority Structure
ID0
ID1
ID2
41.75
2.4
5.4
41.3
2.95
4.7
3.95
0.4
0
0.85
0.05
0

LP200
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
47.35
48.15
2.4
0.75

ID1
24
19.45
2.2
0.25

LP275
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
42.55
43.95
2.45
0.75

LP350
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID3
34.65
27
0.35
0.05

ID4
5.8
6.05
0.3
0.05

ID2
0
0
0
0

ID3
18.6
14.4
0.4
0

ID4
0.05
0
0
0

ID1
6
5.8
0.3
0.1

ID2
0.3
0.5
0
0

ID3
19.6
13.45
0.4
0.15

ID4
21.55
18.3
1.85
0

ID0
18.3
22.5
0
0

ID1
35.8
31.1
3.05
1

ID2
0
0
0
0

ID3
19.95
15.25
0.8
0

ID4
15.95
13.15
1.15
0

LP425
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
45.05
47.55
2.95
1

ID1
0
0
0
0

ID2
0
0
0
0

ID3
22.5
17.05
1
0

ID4
22.45
17.4
1.05
0

LP10000
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
38.55
32.8
4.05
0.8

ID1
13.65
11.5
0
0

ID2
8.6
10.1
0.95
0

ID3
11.65
10.7
0
0

ID4
17.55
16.9
0
0.2
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Table 3 shows the degree to which the centralized authority structure was
dismantled at each listening percentage. Each row shows the number of each
type of influential – low influence level of 3, medium = 5, high = 7, and max = 10
– on each identity at each listening percentage. Initial influential totals were: 45
low-level, 42 mid-level, 5 high-level, and 1 max-level influentials activated on ID0,
and 45 low-level and 42 mid-level influentials activated with a random distribution
on the other identities.
Table 4: Collective Action in terms of Dismantling the Regime, DAS
LP125
Low
Mid
High
Max

Decentralized Authority
ID0
ID1
40.6
7.9
30.8
8.25
2.7
0.15
0
0

Structure
ID2
7.35
6.15
0
0

ID3
23.1
26.5
2
1

ID4
11.05
10.3
0.15
0

LP200
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
53.35
38.1
3
0

ID1
20.05
30.15
1.4
0.4

ID2
2.45
0.4
0
0

ID3
12.2
12.05
0.6
0.6

ID4
1.95
1.3
0
0

LP275
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
46.3
33.55
2.6
0

ID1
24.4
32.4
2.2
1

ID2
0.95
0.85
0
0

ID3
17.7
14.55
0.2
0

ID4
0.65
0.65
0
0

LP350
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
18.5
12.45
1
0

ID1
51.35
52.3
3.4
1

ID2
0
0
0
0

ID3
19.75
17.25
0.6
0

ID4
0.4
0
0
0

LP425
Low
Mid
High
Max

ID0
31.65
25.75
3
0

ID1
4.35
3.8
0
0

ID2
0
0
0
0

ID3
39.8
30.95
0
0

ID4
14.2
21.5
2
1

LP10000

ID0

ID1

ID2

ID3

ID4
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Low
Mid
High
Max

39.45
36.95
2.45
0.75

14.4
15.1
0.3
0

9.5
9.45
1
0

13.7
8.35
0
0.2

12.95
12.15
1.25
0.05

Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of influentials across listening
percentages and identities for the centralized and decentralized authority
structures, respectively. Using SR1 LP10k as the baseline, the trend is that in the
SR10 landscapes, as listening percentage increases, the number of influentials
activated on the dominant identity (ID0) declines. Those identities that took
higher-level influentials from the regime structure also added more low and midlevel influentials, suggesting a correlation between obtaining higher-level
influential agents and obtaining lower-level influential agents. Just how strong is
this relationship?

Table 5: Correlations of Max Influential to Other Influentials

Max to Low
Max to Med
Max to High

Correlation (r)
DAS
CAS
0.3101
0.8062
0.5504
0.8414
0.5198
0.872

The regime structures seemed to follow the high-level influentials and the
max-level influential with varying strength. As Table 5 shows, having those
upper-tier influentials correlates highly to having lower-tier influentials, showing
that the regime structure did work. The correlations were consistently strong in
the CAS – having a higher percentage of max level influentials over the course of
a run correlated to having a higher percentage of lower level influentials with r =
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.8062, but correlated more strongly as the influential level went up – with r =
.8414 for medium influentials, and r = .872 for high-level influentials. The DAS
showed a significantly weaker pattern of relationship, with a max influential to low
influential correlation of r = .3101, a max to medium correlation of r = .5504, and
a max to high-level influentials correlation of r = .5198. These scores show that
the regime was very tight in the centralized authority structure, and weak to
moderately strong in the decentralized structure.
Overall, as listening percentage increased the number of influentials on
the dominant identity declined both on the DAS and CAS landscapes. Therefore,
there seems to be some collective action against the regime occurring in this
model not due to geographic factors or initial landscape layout.
For pictures of snapshots from various experiments, consult Appendix II.
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V. Conclusions
Identity Dominance
The results show that increasing sight range while holding all else
constant – including listening percentage – creates landscapes in which the
dominant identity takes over more quickly and more completely (Figure 4).
As I mentioned earlier, prevalence must not be equated to
institutionalization. However, if the increase in SR had resulted in drastically
reduced identity dominance, it would be a major argument against the notion that
increasing sight range has a positive effect on landscape social capital. It would
imply fewer utilizable connections made, and cause gridlock on initial identities. A
landscape in gridlock does not seem like one in which there are connections
utilizable for mutually beneficial purposes. Though identity prevalence does not
equate to institutionalization, or to a landscape’s social capital, it is related to it.
The drastic increase in identity prevalence in SR10 landscapes versus SR1
landscapes offers another nod to the power of the Internet.

SCID Experiment
It is clear from the graphs and tables that the increase of sight range and
simultaneous increase of number of agents listened to resulted in a complete
dismantling of institutionalization. Issues translating the landscapes from an older
model into a newer platform may explain a portion of this, but this does not seem
like a major explanatory factor. When the original files were used,
institutionalization occurred. Because the institutionalization still occurred with the
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original files even in the new platform, I proceeded with the actual experiment of
increasing sight range and adjusting listening percentage.
When the sight range was increased and the listening percentage
decreased (LP125, Figure 5), institutionalization never conclusively occurred. At
LP125, the landscape did seem to achieve some consistency that may have
been institutionalization – more experiments would be needed to confirm or
refute this possibility. This finding suggests that when fewer agents are listened
to over a larger space, institutionalization may still occur. As the number of
agents listened to increases, the presence of institutionalization definitely
evaporates – as Figure 5 (as well as Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix I) shows, even
when an institutional level jump occurred, it was not maintained. However, higher
maxima were achieved as listening percentage increased, reaching above 90%
(Table 1). This is a significantly higher percentage than the 77% maximum of the
SCID SR1 LP10k baseline replication. Therefore, having a higher number of
agents to influence and be influenced by resulted in greater ultimate magnitude
of identity dominance, and high dominance is a characteristic of an
institutionalized identity. But, institutionalization implies continued dominance
once a threshold is crossed. That continuity could not be established – either the
sample size was too small, as the very high standard deviations suggest (Tables
8 and 9 in Appendix I), or remote interaction leads to weakened institutions.
Therefore, it is impossible to say with the current set of experiments that remote
interactions increase the net social capital of a landscape from the point of view
of ease of institution-formation, because institutionalization did not occur more
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quickly in landscapes with higher sight range and listening percent – indeed,
institutionalization did not conclusively occur at all.
Several theorists agree that far-apart interactions generate bridging
capital, and the present experiment shows that phenomenon. Indeed, this effect
is visible in today’s society. With increased interconnectivity across a wider
space, random luck – bias – plays a bigger role, and, as the models suggest,
whatever “idea” happens to be in vogue spreads like wildfire and then fizzles out,
only to return to glory or be replaced by another idea. As mentioned earlier, one
important example is the 2011 Arab Spring, when a combination of local activism
and online activism changed the face of the Middle East. An even more recent
example is the online-spurred protests that killed the SOPA and PIPA acts in
Congress. One quaint real life example experienced across college campuses is
the phenomenon called “icing.” Students would surprise their peers with a bottle
of Smirnoff Ice – a carbonated, flavored alcoholic beverage – at which point the
victim gets on his or her knee and chug the entire bottle. Such a fad is, of course,
utterly ridiculous, and without logic or reason – but it caught on, for one reason or
another, and became exceptionally popular. As quick as it rose, it fell off the map,
in favor of the next fad. Another similar phenomenon has been the oddity that is
“planking,” which is the art of taking a picture of a person lying down horizontally
– no more, no less – in an odd context or on an interesting surface. Such images
are then put on the Internet and accumulate thousands of views. These ideas are
silly, but represent an important phenomenon that is part of our developing
society – a society that increasingly revolves around the Internet.
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Perhaps what the models show us is that while an idea may see
institutional-level dominance in societies with large amounts of remote
interaction, the institutional-level structural maintenance is more difficult in
societies with primarily far-apart interactions. Essentially, perhaps the Internet
does mitigate social capital decline, in that it does allow the aspects of networks
that are beneficial to exert their positive effect on their own identity. But, perhaps
the Internet simultaneously magnifies the fickle nature of society.
Theorists’ suggestions that the Internet increases bridging social capital
without touching bonding social capital again comes into play. Perhaps bridging
social capital aids identity spread and actually creates the institution, but the
bonding social capital – those face-to-face interactions that cement relationships
– provide the glue that maintains the institution. The SCID experiment provides
support to Putnam’s notion ”that meeting in an electronic forum is not the
equivalent of meeting in a bowling alley” (Putnam 1995, 74). The experiment also
supports the assertion of Ellison et al. that:
Bridging social capital might be augmented by such [online social network] sites,
which support loose social ties, allowing users to create and maintain larger,
diffuse networks of relationships from which they could potentially draw
resources (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007, 1146).
Certainly this experiment is not conclusive, but it provides a unique perspective
that lends support to a theory of the Internet. When an agent listens to many
agents, it has a significant amount of information at its fingertips, and can make
the most informed decision for itself – it can focus on being that which is best for
itself, as opposed to taking a more limited view of toeing the local party line.
Ultimately, this contributes to answering the fundamental question of whether or
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not the Internet can mitigate the decline in social capital – the SCID experiment
suggests that the Internet can mitigate certain forms of that decline, but also
indicates that bowling online does not forge the bonds of brotherhood that
bowling in leagues apparently can.

Centralized and Decentralized Authority Structures
The notion that landscapes with higher sight range support more bridging
social capital, but not bonding social capital, finds further support in the CAS and
DAS experiments. Again we recall the Arab Spring, when the Egyptian authority
structure was taken down through initially far-apart interactions. Perhaps Egypt’s
social capital shifted from being primarily bonding to primarily bridging, allowing
for the kind of tumultuous identity shift seen in the SCID experiment (Figure 5).
As sight range and listening percentage increased, the CAS and DAS models
featured increasing numbers of influential agents defecting from the authority
regime, suggesting that strong bonds are not necessary to overthrow a regime.
Bridging capital, perhaps ineffective at maintaining regimes, nevertheless seems
to excel at removing them.
Another notable aspect of the CAS and DAS experiments is the support
they lend to Putnam’s concerns over the possibility of cyberbalkanization. The
CAS and DAS landscapes featured very high tensions, and as Appendix II
shows, the characteristic of these landscapes is mostly uniform, with a few
agents surrounded by a sea of opposition-identity agents. Tension measures
oppositional identities in a local neighborhood – the 8 agents around a given
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agent. The hallmark of cyberbalkanization in high sight range landscapes would
be high tension, since that means a largely homogenous landscape, in which
agents listen only to agents on their own identity, dotted by a few contrarian
agents in an isolated static network of their own. Because a few of those agents
will not activate on the dominant identity, those agents experience large tension.

Triangulation Conclusions
Several conclusions can be gleaned from these studies. Firstly, one of the
major questions was to test whether the far-apart interactions can generate
institutionalization the same way that face-to-face interactions can, and if so
whether or not far-apart interactions could lower that institutionalization threshold.
If they could lower the threshold, that would be an indication that an institution
can more easily help its own agents in a high sight-range landscape, which
would be an indication of more social capital in that landscape. The answer to
that question is that far-apart interactions, in this study, cannot generate
institutionalization in the same way face-to-face interactions can, meaning that
the landscape’s social capital is probably not increased when sight range
increases. However, the identity dominance experiment demonstrated quite
conclusively that increasing SR increases the speed and magnitude with which a
dominant identity takes over a landscape, which is a proxy for how quickly and
totally an idea or a political group can spread. Given the multiple types of social
capital, the ease and totality with which identities spread, and the inability to
maintain institutional status even when dominance is achieved, this study
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suggests that far-apart interactions increase a landscape’s ratio of bridging to
bonding social capital.
This notion is supported by the CAS and DAS experiments, which show
that collective action can be initiated from non-local interaction, and that regimes
can be dismantled to some degree by far-apart interactions, just like the Arab
Spring has shown. The regime structure, while weakened, did not disappear in
any landscapes, suggesting perhaps that some local interactions are necessary
to fully dismantle an authority structure.
The CAS and DAS studies further support Putnam’s notion of
cyberbalkanization due to the high tension in the landscape. It would be worth
investigating methods of limiting this cyberbalkanization, as well as examining
mixtures of local and non-local interaction that break apart a regime, and
mixtures that create a maximally effective institution. Possibly, there is a sweet
spot between far-apart interactions and local interactions that prevents
cyberbalkanization, enables institutionalization, and lubricates collective action.
Such a study would also be more representative of real life – very few people
have purely face-to-face interactions anymore, and very few have purely farapart interactions. This study tried to replicate that, by having SR10 landscapes
on a 50 by 50 grid, meaning an agent was more likely to interact with an agent
closer to it than with an agent on the other side of the landscape. Refining this
method to enable agents to listen to portions of their Moore neighborhood, plus
farther away agents, would be a closer approximation of real life. Most of us
reside somewhere on a continuum of local vs. non-local interactions, and
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operationalizing that continuum ought to be the next step in determining how the
Internet and its rampant growth affect our society.
Finally, the standard deviations in the SCID experiment suggest that,
given the current paradigm, far more histories are necessary to establish more
certain results. This may be because, in a given landscape with remote listening,
it is entirely possible that numerous agents are completely ignored – nothing in
the model guarantees an agent will influence another agent, only that they will
listen to other agents. This effect would be mitigated with more trials.
If future experiments refine the landscapes’ listening rules and increase
the number of trials, agent-based modeling could contribute the conversation
about the effect of the Internet on society. It seems, at least, worth exploring.
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Appendix I: Tables and Graphs
Figure 6: SCID Replication with Sight Radius 1, Listening Percentage 100%
(Every agent listens to 8 other agents)

Table 5: SCID Replication with SR = 1, LP = 100%

% Initial Dominance
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

% End Dominance for Initial DI
53.889
52.517
53.600
50.896
67.594
64.133
65.254
65.127
73.090
76.948
73.267

Gur 55
Figure 7: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage
1.25% (Every agent listens to 5 other agents)

Table 7: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 1.25% (5 agents listened to)

% Initial
Dominance
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

% End Dominance
for Initial Dominant
Identity
42.90%
53.24%
44.91%
63.80%
48.50%
33.98%
56.09%
72.77%
70.73%
74.71%
77.97%

Standard
Deviation
12.69%
10.65%
13.72%
13.33%
10.89%
9.97%
13.06%
10.14%
11.51%
7.43%
9.34%
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Figure 8: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage
2.00% (Every agent listens to 8 other agents)

Table 8: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 2.00% (8 agents listened to)

% Initial
Dominance
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

% End Dominance
for Initial
Dominant Identity
0.20
0.51
0.43
0.46
0.37
0.87
0.54
0.79
0.87
0.41
0.89

Standard
Deviation
14.42%
17.29%
15.13%
12.42%
28.30%
12.50%
12.24%
7.38%
5.89%
12.39%
4.09%
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Figure 9: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage
2.75% (Every agent listens to 11 other agents)

Table 9: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 2.75% (11 agents listened to)

% Initial
Dominance
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

% End Dominance
for Initial
Dominant Identity
22.25%
60.79%
51.61%
67.33%
70.07%
87.54%
59.73%
58.01%
88.31%
38.93%
92.12%

Standard
Deviation
16.49%
19.28%
10.49%
22.53%
18.06%
15.35%
20.24%
14.85%
5.78%
14.75%
6.43%
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Appendix II: Example Landscape Photos
Figure 10: ID Dom SR10 LP125

Figure 11: ID Dom SR10 LP200

Figure 12: ID Dom SR1 LP6250

Figure 13: ID Dom SR10 LP200

These photos are from the ID Dominance experiments. The SR10
landscapes featured few clusters of agents – rather, there were agents
sporadically scattered on opposing identities in a sea of dominant-identity agents.
The SR1 landscapes show that, when SR is low, agents will cluster around their
own identity – there are few rogue agents, and those that are rogue have high
influence or are surrounded by several other identities. This experiment shows
that as SR increases, the dominant identity gets more dominant more quickly.
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Figure 14: SCID5050 SR1, LP 10K

Figure 15: SCID5050 SR10 LP 275

Figure 16: SCID5545 SR1, LP 125

Figure 17: SCID6040 SR10 LP 200

Figures 14 through 17 are examples of the SCID landscapes. Border
agents limit the torus at the top and bottom of the landscapes. The SR1
landscape features clusters of agents on identities in regions. When sight range
increases, an identity becomes more dominant, the clustering disappears, and
the landscape may tip in any direction more quickly, overcoming (or never
gaining) institutionalization effects.
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Figure 18: CAS SR 1, LP 10k

Figure 19: CAS SR 10, LP 125

Figure 20: CAS SR 10, LP 200

Figure 21: CAS SR 10, LP 275

Figure 22: CAS SR 10, LP 350

Figure 23: CAS SR 10, LP 425
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Figure 24: DAS SR 1, LP 10k,

Figure 25: DAS SR 10, LP 125

Figure 26: DAS SR 10, LP 200

Figure 27: DAS SR 10, LP 275

Figure 28: DAS SR 10, LP 350

Figure 29: DAS SR 10, LP 425

These selected photos are from the Centralized and Decentralized
Authority Structure experiments, and are taken from the 18th run in each set of
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experiments so that the only difference between each landscape (other than
Figure 18, where SR is 1 as opposed to 10) is due to listening percentage, or due
to different structure type. Geographic distribution did not seem to greatly affect
the results of this particular model.
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